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Abstract
Flow watermarks efficiently link packet flows in a network in order to thwart various attacks such as
stepping stones. We study the problem of designing good flow watermarks. Earlier flow watermarking
schemes mostly considered substitution errors, neglecting the effects of packet insertions and deletions
that commonly happen within a network. More recent schemes consider packet deletions but often at
the expense of the watermark visibility. We present an invisible flow watermarking scheme capable
of enduring a large number of packet losses and insertions. To maintain invisibility, our scheme uses
quantization index modulation (QIM) to embed the watermark into inter-packet delays, as opposed to
time intervals including many packets. As the watermark is injected within individual packets, packet
losses and insertions may lead to watermark desynchronization and substitution errors. To address this
issue, we add a layer of error-correction coding to our scheme. Experimental results on both synthetic
and real network traces demonstrate that our scheme is robust to network jitter, packet drops and splits,
while remaining invisible to an attacker.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Detecting correlated network flows, also known as flow linking, is a technique for traffic analysis with
wide applications in network security and privacy. For instance, it may be utilized to expose a stepping
stone attacker who hides behind proxy hosts. Alternatively, flow linking has been successfully used to
attack low-latency anonymity networks such as Tor [2], where anonymity is compromised once end flows
are correctly matched. As network connections are often encrypted, it is infeasible to link flows directly
relying on packet contents. However, matching flows using side information such as packet timings is
possible, as their values remain to some extent unchanged even after encryption [3]–[5].
Earlier work in flow linking was based on long observation of flow characteristics, such as the number
of ON/OF periods [4]. Such passive techniques are fragile vis-a-vis network artifacts and require long
observation periods to avoid large false alarm rates. Flow watermarking, an active approach, was suggested
as an improvement. In this approach, a pattern, the watermark, is injected into the flow with the hope that
the flow stays traceable after traversing the network as long as the same pattern can be later extracted [2],
[6]–[10]. Unlike passive schemes, flow watermarking is highly reliable and works effectively on short
flows.
The challenge of designing good flow watermarks is to keep the injected pattern robust to network
artifacts yet invisible to watermark attackers.1 The robustness requirement guarantees that the injected
pattern survives network artifacts, while the invisibility property prevents watermark removal attempts
by active attackers. Most state-of-the-art schemes currently trade off one of the two properties at the
expense of the other. In the so called interval-based schemes [2], [8], a flow is divided into intervals, and
all packets within selected intervals are shifted to form a watermark pattern. Given that a few packets
would not greatly affect the pattern created in the entire interval, these schemes are robust against network
artifacts such as packet drops and splits. However, shifting a large number of packets produces noticeable
‘traces’ of the embedded watermarks and compromises the invisibility requirement [11]. In inter-packet-
delay (IPD)-based schemes [6], [9], the delays between consecutive packets are modulated to embed
watermarks. Since only small perturbations are introduced in each inter-arrival time, watermarks are not
visible. The drawback of this approach is that any packet loss or insertion during transmission can cause
1The goal of watermark attackers is to prevent the success of flow linking by disrupting the detection or altogether removing
the watermarks from the flow.
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3watermark desynchronization and severe decoding errors.
In this paper, we present a new IPD-based flow watermarking scheme where invisible watermark
patterns are injected in the inter-arrival-time of successive packets. We treat the network as a channel
with substitution, deletion, and bursty insertion errors caused by jitter, packet drops, and packet splits or
retransmission, respectively, and introduce an insertion, deletion and substitution (IDS) error-correction
coding scheme to communicate the watermark reliably over the channel. At the same time, we preserve
watermark invisibility by making unnoticeable modifications to packet timings using the QIM frame-
work [12]. Through experiments on both synthetic and real network traces, we show that our scheme
performs reliably in presence of network jitter, packet losses and insertions. Furthermore, we verify
the watermark invisibility using Kolmogorov-Smirnov [13] and multi-flow-attack tests [11]. Deletion
correction codes were first applied to flow watermarking in [1], where watermarks can be decoded
correctly after packet losses as long as the first packet in the flow was not dropped. In this work, we
extend our decoder to handle more realistic network environments where not only packet losses but
also packet insertions occur. Furthermore, synchronization requirement on the first packet is relaxed. To
verify the performance of our scheme, traffic traces collected from real SSH connections are tested. This
improves the simulation setup in [1], where merely simulated synthetic traffic was used.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Background on flow watermarking appears in §II. We
describe notations and definitions in §III. Our proposed scheme is presented in §IV. We evaluate the
performance of our scheme using synthetic and real traffic traces in §V.
II. BACKGROUND
This section covers some background material on flow watermarking. First, we describe three applica-
tion scenarios of flow watermarking. Second, we discuss some principles for designing good watermarking
schemes. We conclude by surveying the literature.
A. Applications
We begin with a stepping-stone detection scenario where flow watermarks are used to find hidden
network attackers. Figure 1 depicts an attacker Bob who wants to attack a victim Alice without exposing
his identity. Bob first remotely logins to a compromised intermediate host Charlie via SSH [14]. Then he
proceeds by sending attack flows to Alice from Charlie’s machine. Tracing packet flows sent to Alice’s
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Fig. 1. Detecting attackers behind stepping stones. Bob uses Charlie as a stepping stone to attack Alice so that his identity
remains hidden from Alice. To traceback the origin of this attack, Alice injects a watermark on the flow sent back to the stepping
stone. The path leading to Bob is exposed as every router along this path detects Alice’s watermark on flows passing through.
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Fig. 2. (a) Stepping stones in enterprise networks. An intruder compromises a host in the enterprise network as a ‘stepping stone’.
The enterprise embeds watermarks on all incoming flows and monitors all the outgoing flows. Any pair of incoming/outgoing
flows with the same watermark indicates the existence of inside stepping stones. (b) An anonymity network. Incoming flows
are shuffled before leaving the system to hide the pairing among communicating parties.
machine would implicate Charlie instead of Bob as the attacker. Hosts like Charlie, exploited to hide
the real attack source, are called as stepping stones [3]. In real life, attackers may hide behind a chain of
stepping stones, making it hard for the victim, who only sees the last hop, to determine the origin of the
attack. Fortunately, flow watermarking is a solution for tracing the attack source. Notice that an interactive
connection is maintained along Bob-Charlie-Alice during the above stepping stone attack. Hence Alice
can secretly embed a watermark in the packet flow heading back to Charlie. As this flow travels back to
Bob, the watermark could be subsequently detected by the intermediate routers (or firewalls), revealing
the attack path and its true origin [15], [16].
Another scenario of stepping-stone attack occurs in enterprise networks, as shown in Figure 2(a). Here,
intruders are trying to compromise hosts in an enterprise network to relay their malicious traffic [11], [17].
To discover this kind of ‘stepping stones’ within the network, an enterprise can add watermarks on all
incoming flows, and then terminate outgoing flows that contain the watermark since they most probably
come from stepping stones. In a similar fashion, flow watermarking may be applied to attacking anonymity
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5network systems [14], [18]–[20]. In order to hide the identities of communicating parties, an anonymity
network shuffles all the flows passing through it, as shown in Figure 2(b). If an attacker somehow
discovers the hidden mappings between incoming and outgoing flows, the anonymity is compromised.
Akin to the previous enterprise network scenario, this can be achieved by marking all incoming flows
with watermarks and subsequently detecting the watermarks on the exiting flows.
B. Design Principles
From above application examples, we summarize a list of principles for designing flow watermarks.
The challenge of building an efficient scheme lies in the difficulty of achieving all desired properties
simultaneously.
• Robustness. One major advantage of flow watermarking over passive traffic analysis is the robustness
against network noise. Take the stepping stone attack of Figure 1 for example. The flow Alice sends
back to Bob is subjected to jitter, packet drops, and packet splits during transmission. All these
artifacts can alter the watermark, resulting in decoding errors. Without the ability to withstand these
artifacts, flow watermarking is no different than passive analysis, which is fragile by nature.
• Invisibility. A successful watermark pattern should stay ‘invisible’ to avoid possible attacks. For
instance, in Figure 2(a), if the intruder notices that incoming flows contain watermarks, it can
command the stepping stone to take precautionary actions (for instance, remove the watermarks
altogether).
• Blindness. In a blind watermarking scheme, the watermark pattern can be extracted without the help
of the original flow [21]. On the contrary, the original flow must be present in order to detect non-
blind watermarks. Again, consider the example of Figure 2(a). In order to detect the stepping stone,
the enterprise needs to perform watermark decoding on all outgoing flows. If a non-blind detection
scheme is used, all exit routers are required to obtain a copy of each incoming flow. The resulting
overheads of bandwidth and storage make such schemes impractical in large enterprise networks.
• Presense watermarking. In conventional digital watermarking (e.g., multimedia watermarking), often
a large amount of hiding capacity is desired as the injected watermarks are frequently used to achieve
copyright among many users [22]. This, fortunately, is not required for most flow watermarking
applications, since the main purpose of injecting watermarks here is to link flows initiated from the
same sources. In other words, in digital watermarking terminology, zero-bit or presence watermarks
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6suffice [21]. Therefore, when designing a flow watermarking scheme, one may trade the capacity
for other properties such as robustness (see the discussion in §IV-B).
C. Watermark Attack Models
The difficulty of maintaining watermark invisibility depends on the specific attack model. Based on
the strength of the watermark attacker, attack models may be classified as follows:
• Level-I: the attacker observes the watermarked flow, and has knowledge of certain feature (e.g.,
empirical distributions of IPDs) of the original flow;
• Level-II: the attacker observes the watermarked flow, and has a distorted version of the original flow;
• Level-III: the attacker observes both the watermarked flow and the original flow.
In Level-I, the weakest attack model, the attacker can only discover the presence of watermark by
statistical approaches that real a deviation of know features from the norm in the original flow. For
interval based schemes, the multi-flow attack (MFA) exposes empty intervals in the combination of
several watermarked flows [11]. For IPD-based schemes, the empirical distribution of IPDs, which should
not be changed with high probability, distinguishes watermarked flows from unwatermarked ones via
Kolmogorov-Simirnov (K-S) tests [9], [13]. We show in §V-C that our watermark does not introduce
noticeable patterns for the MFA or the KS test to detect it.
In Level-II, given a distorted version of the original flow, the attacker has in effect an imperfect
realization of the original flow signal which is more informative than the statistical information a Level-I
attacker has. A Level-II attack, BACKLIT was recently proposed, where the attacker serves as a traffic
relay between the client and server of a TCP connection and thus sees both REQUEST and RESPONSE
flows [24]. When watermarks are added, packets along one direction (i.e., RESPONSE) must be delayed.
The attacker can detect this ‘delayed’ timing pattern as he observes the ‘clean’ flow in the REQUEST
direction. BACKLIT works well when a strong correlation between the REQUEST and RESPONSE flows
exists, in which case the attack has a high fidelity version of the original flow. In §V-C, we evaluate our
scheme against BACKLIT. We show that in practice the correlation between the response and request
flows are destroyed for the most part by network jitter because watermarks in our scheme that add very
small perturbations to IPDs can remain hidden.
A Level-III attacker, who observes the exact original flow has a significantly easier task detecting the
presence of a watermark [23]. This attack model, however, requires the attacker to be able to observe
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7arbitrary flows everywhere in the network, which is impossible for most real applications. In this work,
we focus on the first two attack models when evaluating watermark invisibility.
D. Related Work
We briefly review previous flow watermarking literature. To the best of our knowledge, all the previous
schemes fail to meet at least one of the above design principles, necessitating the development of a
comprehensive approach that meets all the aforementioned criteria.
Earlier flow watermarks are of inter packet delay (IPD)-based type. In [6], the authors propose an
IPD-based scheme that modulates the mean of selected IPDs using the QIM framework. Watermark
synchronization is lost if enough packets are dropped or split. Therefore the scheme is unreliable. Another
IPD-based scheme is presented in [9], where watermarks are added by enlarging or shrinking the IPDs.
This non-blind scheme achieves some watermark resynchronizations when packets are dropped or split,
but is not scalable as the original packet flow is required during decoding.
In interval-based schemes, instead of using the IPDs between individual packets, the watermark pattern
is encoded into batch packet characteristics within fixed time intervals. In [2], an interval-centroid scheme
is proposed. After dividing the flow into time intervals of the same length, the authors create two patterns
by manipulating the centroid of packets within each interval. The modified centroids are not easily changed
even after packets are delayed, lost or split. A similar design is presented in [8], where the watermark
pattern is embedded in the packet densities of predefined time intervals. One problem with interval-based
schemes is the lack of invisibility. Moving packets in batches generates visible artifacts, which can expose
the watermark positions. Based on this observation, a multi-flow attack (MFA) was proposed in [11].
The authors showed that by lining up as few as 10 watermarked flows, an attacker can observe a number
of large gaps between packets (see Figure.10 in [11]) in the aggregate flow, revealing the watermark
positions. Recently, a new interval-based scheme was proposed in [28]. The main idea is that the exact
locations of modified intervals depends on the flow pattern. This flow-dependent design reduces the
success rate of MFA, but makes it more difficult to retrieve the correct intervals for decoding in face
of strong network noise. Moreover, the perturbation introduced in the IPDs is large enough to make the
scheme susceptible to Level-II attacks such as BACKLIT.
Table I compares existing flow watermarking schemes with our proposed scheme. Unlike previous
work, the new scheme satisfies all the desired properties.
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8TABLE I
SUMMARY OF CURRENT WATERMARKING SCHEMES
Invisibility
Level-I
Invisibility
Level-II Robustness Blindness
Interval-based
[2] no no yes yes
[8] no no yes yes
[28] yes no yes yes
IPD-based
[6] yes yes∗ no yes
[9] yes no yes no
The proposed scheme yes yes∗ yes yes
*The Level-II attack model is effective only when network jitter is small. Schemes like ours that add very small perturbations
to IPDs remain hidden under normal network operating conditions (See §V-C).
III. NOTATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
In the discussion of the rest of the paper, we use the following notation. ab = {a1, a2, · · · , ab} is a
sequence of length b; art = {at, · · · , ar} is a sequence in ab starting with index r and ending with t.
Specially, if r ≤ t, art is an empty sequence, denoted by ∅; ⊕ denotes the ‘xor’ operation.
We also define the following variables used in our scheme.
• IM is the IPD sequence of an original packet flow, where each delay, Ii, is positive real valued;
• I′
M is the IPD sequence of the same flow after injection of the watermark pattern;
• IˆM
′ is the IPD sequence received by the watermark decoder;
• wn is the binary watermark sequence;
• w˜N is a sparse version of wN , where N = sn;
• s is the sparsification factor and is integer valued;
• f is the density of w˜N (see (2));
• kN is a pseudo-random binary key sequence;
• xN is a binary sequence, generated from the watermark wn and the key kN , and embedded into
flow IPDs;
• yN
′ is decoder’s estimate of xN ;
• wˆn the estimate of the watermark sequence wn at the decoder;
• ∆ is a real-value step size used for IPD quantizations. It represents the strength of the watermark
signal;
• σ is the standard deviation of jitter;
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Fig. 4. Abstraction of communication channel. The IDS encoder/decoder pair help correct the dependent substitution, deletion,
and bursty insertion errors on the channel.
• Ps, PI , and Pd represent the probability of a substitution, an insertion, and a deletion event in the
communication channel model of the network, respectively.
IV. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
A. Overview of the System
Figure 3 depicts the schematic of our proposed scheme, which can be divided into two layers:
the insertion deletion substitution (IDS) encoder/decoder and the quantization index modulation (QIM)
encoder/decoder. In the upper layer, the watermark sequence wn is processed to generate an IDS error-
correction codeword xN . On the lower layer, a QIM framework is used to inject xN into the IPDs of
the flow. QIM embedding is blind and causes little change to packet timings [12]. Upon receiving the
flow, the QIM decoder extracts the pattern yN ′ . Subsequently an IDS decoder recovers the watermark,
wˆn, from this pattern.
If we abstract the QIM encoder, the network, and the QIM decoder together as a channel, which takes
xN as the input and spits out yN ′ , flow watermarking is equivalent to solving the problem of sending
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one bit of information (the presence of the watermark) over this compound communication channel (see
Figure 4). Codes for this compound channel must withstand dependent substitution, deletion, and bursty
insertion errors. We next introduce each component of our scheme in details.
B. Insertion Deletion Substitution (IDS) Encoder
Our IDS error correction scheme is inspired by [25], [26], where a ‘marker’ code is employed to provide
reliable communications over a channel with deletion and insertion errors. However, the approach in [25],
[26] is not directly applicable to our channel, as we need to deal with somewhat more complicated errors,
such as dependent substitution, deletion, and bursty insertions which we discuss in §IV-C2.
The IDS encoder works as follows. The watermark sequence wn is first sparsified into a longer sequence
w˜N of length N = sn, as given by
w˜
js
(j−1)s+1 = S (wj) , j = 1, 2, · · · , n, (1)
where S(·) is a deterministic sparsification function that pads wj with zeros, and is known at the decoder.
We denote by density f the ratio of ‘1’ in w˜N , i.e.,
f =
∑N
i=1 w˜i
N
. (2)
f is a decoding parameter shared with the IDS decoder. The sparsified watermark w˜N is then added to
a key kN to form the codeword xN :
xi = w˜i ⊕ ki, i = 1, 2, · · · , N, (3)
where kN is pseudo-random key sequence which is also known at the decoder.
Let us work on a small example of embedding one bit of watermark w1 = 1 in a length 8 sequence.
First w1 is sparsified into an 8 bit sequence w˜8 = 10000000 (the sparsification factor s = 8). Then
we add this sparse sequence to the first 8 bit of our key, k8 = 11111011. The resulting codeword is
x8 = 01111011. Because x8 is only different from the key at one position, the decoder could infer the
positions of deleted or inserted bits by comparing the received codeword with the key. For instance, if the
decoder receives a codeword y7 = 0111011, one bit shorter than the key, then it knows that most likely
a bit ‘1’ from the second run was lost during transmission. Based on this observation, a probabilistic
October 17, 2018 DRAFT
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Fig. 5. An example of substitution errors caused by network jitter. ‘x’s denote even quantizers and ‘o’s odd quantizers. The
bit embedded in I1 is ‘1’, but the decoded bit from Iˆ1 (delay between received packets 0 and 1) is ‘0’.
decoder can be developed to fully recover embedded bits, as will be discussed in §IV-D.
Since wˆN is sparse, the codeword xN is close to the key, which is known at the IDS decoder. Therefore,
the IDS encoding helps synchronize the lost/inserted bits at the cost of information capacity over the
channel, which is not a concern for flow watermarking (see §II-B).
C. Insertion Deletion Substitution (IDS) Channel
1) QIM Embedding: The codeword xN is injected into IPDs of the original flow using QIM embedding.
Given a quantization step size ∆, the QIM encoder changes the IPD, Ii, into an even (or odd) multiplier
of ∆2 given the embedded bit xi is a bit 0 (or 1). The IPDs after modifications are given by
I ′i =


⌈
max(
∑
i
j=1 Ij−
∑
i−1
j=1 I
′
j ,0)
∆
⌉
∆ if xi = 0,(⌈
max(
∑
i
j=1 Ij−
∑
i−1
j=1 I
′
j,0)
∆
⌉
+ 0.5
)
∆ if xi = 1,
(4)
for i = 1, 2, · · ·N , where the ceiling function describes the operation that adds minimum delays to
Packet i to form the desired multiplier of ∆2 .
At the QIM decoder, each embedded bit is extracted based on whether a received IPD is closer to an
even or odd quantizer, i.e.,
yi =


⌊2Iˆi∆ ⌋ mod 2 if
2Iˆi
∆ − ⌊
2Iˆi
∆ ⌋ ≤ 0.5,
⌈2Iˆi∆ ⌉ mod 2 if
2Iˆi
∆ − ⌊
2Iˆi
∆ ⌋ > 0.5.
(5)
2) Channel Model: In presence of network artifacts, received IPDs, IˆM ′ , are different from the original
IPDs IM , leading to errors in decoding xN . Substitution errors occur when network jitter alters IPDs
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Fig. 6. Merging of IPDs as the result of packet drops. The deletion of Packet 1 merges the first two IPDs I1 and I2. and the
deletions of Packet 3 and 4 merge I3, I4 and I5.
largely. Figure 5 depicts one example where an embedded bit is flipped by jitter. In Figure 5, the bit
‘x1 = 1’ was originally encoded in the IPD I1, resulting in I ′1 = ∆2 . But at the QIM decoder, the received
IPD Iˆ1 is pushed by jitter into interval (3∆4 ,∆), and thus decoded as ‘y1 = 0’. In absence of packet drops
or splits, a watermark bit flips if the IPD jitter is larger than ∆4 . Following the observation of previous
work that shows IPD jitter (within a certain period of time) is approximately i.i.d. zero-mean Laplace
distributed [9], the probability of a substitution error by jitter can be estimated as
Ps = 1− F
(
∆
4
)
=
1
2
e
−∆
2
√
2σ , (6)
where F (·) is the Laplacian pdf and σ2 is its variance.
Decoding errors also occur when packets are dropped. As packet drops lead to the merger of successive
IPDs, the resulting error contains both deletion and substitution, which we refer to as dependent deletion
and substitution error. For instance in Figure 6, deletion of Packet 1 merges the IPDs I1 and I2 into a
large received IPD I ′1. As a result, instead of x1 and x2, only one bit x1⊕ x2 is received at the decoder.
We consider this case as a deletion of x1, and possibly a substitution of x2. In this paper, we assume
that each packet is dropped independently with probability Pd. For the convenience of analysis, we also
assume that the head of watermarked packet sequence, Packet 0, is not dropped.
The last type of error comes from packet insertions. This happens when packets are split to meet a
smaller packet size limit, or when TCP transmission is triggered by network congestions. Both cases
cause bursty insertions of packets. An example of such a scenario is depicted in Figure 7. Packet 2 is
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Fig. 7. A scenario with packet insertions. Packet 1 is split into two packets, and Packet 2 is split into three pieces.
split into three smaller ones, creating two new IPDs (2-2’ and 2’-2”, both with zero length). Therefore,
two extra ‘0’ bits would be decoded in yN ′ . In general, newly generated packets are mostly right next
to the original one, hence we consider all inserted bits are‘0’s.2 Furthermore, we assume the number of
inserted packets follows a geometric distribution with parameter PI .
D. Insertion Deletion Substitution (IDS) Decoder
We estimate each watermark bit from yN ′ using the maximum likelihood decoding rule given by
wˆj = arg max
wj∈{0,1}
P
(
yN
′
|wj
)
, j = 1, 2, · · · , n. (7)
Since xN is a deterministic function of w, we derive the likelihood in (7) based on the dependency
between yN ′ and xN over the IDS channel. Suppose the QIM decoder received i′ − 1 packets after the
first i− 1 packets were sent out by the QIM encoder, and assume the i′− 1th packet in the received flow
corresponds to the qth packet in the sent flow or a packet inserted immediately after it (q ≤ i− 1). The
possible outcomes after Packet i is sent are:
• if Packet i in the sent flow is lost and no packets are inserted, the QIM decoder cannot decode
new bits;
• if Packet i is lost but l > 0 new packets are inserted right after it, the decoder could decode l bits,
yi
′+l−1
i′ , from newly received IPDs;
2Our methodology can be extended to cover the case that both ‘0’ and ‘1’ bits may be inserted.
October 17, 2018 DRAFT
14
• if Packet i is received and additionally l ≥ 0 packets are inserted, the decoder can decode l + 1
new bits, yi′+li′ .
In the last two cases, the new IPD between the i′ − 1th packet and i′th packets in the received flow
corresponds to the merger of all IPDs between Packet q and Packet i in the sent flow. Hence, the first
new bit, yi′ , is given by
yi′ =


xq+1 ⊕ xq+2 · · · ⊕ xi w. p. 1− Ps,
xq+1 ⊕ xq+2 · · · ⊕ xi ⊕ 1 w. p. Ps,
(8)
where Ps is the probability of a substitution error given in (6). The remaining new bits yi′+l−1i′+1 (or yi
′+l
i′+1)
are just ‘0’ bits resulting from bursty packet insertions.
1) Hidden Markov Model: To capture the evolution of newly decoded bits from the received flow, we
define the state after sending each packet with the pair (x′i, di), for i = 1, 2, · · ·N , where
• The accumulated bit x′i it the sum of all bits resulting from merger of the IPDs between Packet i
and the previous packet that was received at the decoder. If Packet i − 1 was received, then the
x′i is just the bit embedded on the IPD between Packet i and i− 1, i.e., xi. On the other hand, if
Packet i− 1 was completely lost (i.e., after its deletion, there were no insertions), x′i would be the
sum of current bit xi and bits embedded on previously merged IPDs, i.e., xi ⊕ x′i−1. To sum up,
x′i =


xi w. p. 1− Pd (1− PI) ,
xi ⊕ x
′
i−1 w. p. Pd (1− PI) .
(9)
Recall from (3) that xN is generatd using the key kN and the sparse watermark sequence w˜. We will
model the sparse watermark bits w˜i’s as independent Bernoulli(f) random variables. Therefore (9)
can be rewritten as
x′i =


ki w. p. (1− f) (1− Pd(1− PI)) ,
ki ⊕ 1 w. p. f (1− Pd(1− PI)) ,
ki ⊕ x
′
i−1 w. p. (1− f)Pd (1− PI) ,
ki ⊕ x
′
i−1 ⊕ 1 w. p. fPd (1− PI) .
(10)
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Note that from (9), we can rewrite (8) as
yi′ =


x′i w. p. 1− Ps,
x′i ⊕ 1 w. p. Ps.
(11)
• The drift di is the shift in position of the sent Packet i in the received flow, i.e., if Packet i was not
lost, it would appear at position i′ = i+ di in the received flow. Given di−1, the drift of Packet i
is updated as
di =


di−1 − 1 w. p. Pd (1− PI) ,
di−1 + l, l ≥ 0 w. p.
(
PdP
l+1
I (1− PI) + (1− Pd)P
l
I(1− PI)
)
,
(12)
where the first case occurs when Packet i− 1 was dropped with no new packets inserted, and the
second case occurs when total of l packets are received either because Packet i − 1 was dropped
and there were l + 1 insertions or Packet i was received and there were l insertions. For the first
Packet 0, we initialize d0 = 0. This minor change let us relax the synchronization requirement on
the first packet.
Combine (11) and (10), and given i′ = i+ di, we have
yi+di =


ki w. p. ((1− f)(1− Ps) + fPs) (1− Pd(1− PI)) ,
ki ⊕ 1 w. p. (f(1− Ps) + (1− f)Ps) (1− Pd(1− PI)) ,
x′i−1 ⊕ ki w. p. ((1− f)(1− Ps) + fPs)Pd (1− PI) ,
x′i−1 ⊕ ki ⊕ 1 w. p. (f(1− Ps) + (1− f)Ps)Pd (1− PI) .
(13)
Equation (13) captures the HMM with hidden states of (x′i, di), i = 1, 2, · · ·N and observation states
of yN ′ , as depicted in Figure 8. The state transition probabilities P
(
yi−1+dii−1+di−1 , x
′
i, di|x
′
i−1, di−1
)
can be
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Fig. 8. The hidden-Markov model for the IDS channel. The observations are the codewords (yi’s) received by the IDS decoder,
and the hidden states keep track of the drift and accumulated bit when sending every packet.
derived using (10), (12) and (13), summarized as
P
(
yi−1+dii−1+di−1 , x
′
i, di|x
′
i−1, di−1
)
=


(1− f)Pd(1− PI) if x′i = x′i−1 ⊕ ki, di = di−1 − 1 and y
i−1+di
i−1+di−1
= ∅,
fPd(1− PI) if x′i = x′i−1 ⊕ ki ⊕ 1, di = di−1 − 1 and y
i−1+di
i−1+di−1
= ∅,
(1− f)(1− Ps)(1− PI)(PdP
l+1
I + (1− Pd)P
l
I) if x′i = ki, di = di−1 + l and yi−1+di−1 = x′i−1,
f(1− Ps)(1 − PI)(PdP
l+1
I + (1− Pd)P
l
I) if x′i = ki ⊕ 1, di = di−1 + l and yi−1+di−1 = x′i−1,
(1− f)Ps(1− PI)(PdP
l+1
I + (1− Pd)P
l
I) if x′i = ki, di = di−1 + l and yi−1+di−1 = x′i−1 ⊕ 1,
fPs(1− PI)(PdP
l+1
I + (1− Pd)P
l
I) if x′i = ki ⊕ 1, di = di−1 + l and yi−1+di−1 = x′i−1 ⊕ 1.
(14)
For example, after sending Packet i− 1, the system state is (x′i−1, di−1). If Packet i− 1 is lost and
no packets are inserted. Then from (12), the drift of Packet i becomes di = di−1 − 1, and no new bit
is decoded, i.e., yi−1+dii−1+di−1 is an empty sequence. Additionally, the IPD between Packet i and i − 1 is
added to previously merged IPDs such that x′i is decided based on the last two cases in (10). Overall,
the transition probability in this scenario is given by
P
(
∅, x′i, di−1 − 1|x
′
i−1, di−1
)
=


(1− f)Pd(1− PI) if x′i = x′i−1 ⊕ ki,
fPd(1− PI) if x′i = x′i−1 ⊕ ki ⊕ 1.
(15)
2) Forward-Backward Algorithm: For the HMM in Figure 8, we apply the forward-backward algorithm
to derive the posterior probabilities P (yN ′ |wj), j = 1, 2, · · · , n. Let us define the forward quantity as the
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joint probability of bits yi−1+di1 decoded before sending Packet i at the hidden state of (x′i, di), which
is given by
Fi(x
′
i, di) = P (y
i−1+di
1 , x
′
i, di), i = 1, 2, · · · , N. (16)
The forward quantities can be computed recursively using transition probabilities in (14) as
Fi(x
′
i, di) =
∑
x′i−1,
di−1
Fi−1(x
′
i−1, di−1)P (y
i−1+di
i−1+di−1
, x′i, di|x
′
i−1, di−1). (17)
Similarly, we define the backward quantity as the conditional probability of decoding the rest of the
bits in the received flow, yN ′i+di , given the current state (x
′
i, di),
Bi(x
′
i, di) = P (y
N ′
i+di |x
′
i, di), i = 1, 2, · · · , N. (18)
The backward quantities can also be computed recursively as
Bi(x
′
i, di) =
∑
x′i+1,
di+1
P (y
i+di+1
i+di
, x′i+1, di+1|x
′
i, di)Bi+1(x
′
i+1, di+1). (19)
Given the forward/backward quantities, the posterior likelihood of the watermark bit wj is given by
P
(
yN
′
|wj
)
= P
(
yN
′
|w˜js(j−1)s+1
)
=
∑
x′
(j−1)s ,x
′
js,
d(j−1)s ,djs
F(j−1)s
(
x′(j−1)s, d(j−1)s
)
Fˆjs
(
x′js, djs)Bjs(x
′
js, djs
)
, (20)
where the first equality follows from our watermark sparsification function in (1), and the quantity
F ′js(xi, di) is defined as
Fˆjs(x
′
i, di) = P
(
yi−1+di(j−1)s+d(j−1)s , x
′
i, di|x
′
(j−1)s, d(j−1)s, w˜
js
(j−1)s+1
)
, (j − 1)s + 1 ≤ i ≤ js. (21)
The quantity F ′js(x′i, di) can be calculated recursively as
Fˆjs(x
′
i, di) =
∑
x′i−1,
di−1
Fˆjs(x
′
i−1, di−1)P
(
yi−1+dii−1+di−1 , x
′
i, di|x
′
i−1, di−1, w˜
js
(j−1)s+1)
)
, (22)
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TABLE II
TRUE POSITIVE RATES WITH VARYING WATERMARK PARAMETERS WHEN FALSE POSITIVE RATE IS FIXED BELOW 1%.
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
n
∆ (ms) 20 60 100
10 0.0310 0.6050 0.6224
30 0.0310 0.9790 0.9970
50 0.0272 0.9990 1
TABLE III
TRUE POSITIVE RATES UNDER VARYING IPD JITTER WITH FALSE POSITIVE RATES BELOW 1%.
Jitter Std. Dev. (ms) 10 20 30 40
Synthetic traffic 1.000 0.989 0.770 0.232
Real traffic 1.000 0.989 0.652 0.193
where P
(
yi−1+dii−1+di−1 , x
′
i, di|x
′
i−1, di−1, w˜
js
(j−1)s+1)
)
is given by
P
(
yi−1+dii−1+di−1 , x
′
i, di|x
′
i−1, di−1, w˜
js
(j−1)s+1)
)
=

Pd(1− PI) if di = di−1 − 1 and x′i = w˜i ⊕ ki ⊕ x′i−1, and y
i−1+di
i−1+di−1
= ∅,
Ps(1− PI)
(
PdP
di−di−1+1
I + (1− Pd)P
di−di−1
I
)
if di ≥ di−1, x′i = w˜i ⊕ ki and yi−1+di−1 = x′i−1 ⊕ 1,
(1− Ps)(1 − PI)
(
PdP
di−di−1+1
I + (1− Pd)P
di−di−1
I
)
if di ≥ di−1, x′i = w˜i ⊕ ki and yi−1+di−1 = x′i−1.
(23)
Once the posterior probabilities for all watermark bits are calculated, the watermark sequence, wˆn can
be estimated using maximum likelihood rule of (7). Finally, the presence of the watermark in a flow
is decided based on the correlation value of the estimated watermark, wˆn, and the original watermark
sequence, wn.
V. EVALUATION
We tested our scheme for two groups of traces: synthetic packet flows of length 2000 generated from
Poisson process with average rate of 3.3 packets per second (pps), and real SSH traces of length 2000
collected in CAIDA database with average rate of 0.865 pps [27], which represent typical traffic in
human-involved network connections, where flow watermarks are most applicable.
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TABLE IV
TRUE POSITIVE RATES FOR VARYING Pd WITH FALSE POSITIVE RATES BELOW 1%.
Pd 1% 2% 3% 10%
Synthetic traffic 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.995
Real traffic 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.996
TABLE V
TRUE POSITIVE RATES FOR VARING PI WITH FALSE POSITIVE RATES BELOW 1%.
PI 1% 5% 10% 20%
Synthetic traffic 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.500
Real traffic 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.568
TABLE VI
TRUE POSITIVE RATES FOR VARYING PI ,Pd WITH FALSE POSITIVE RATES BELOW 1%.
Pi,Pd 1%,1% 5%,5% 10%,10%
Synthetic 1.000 1.000 0.764
Real 1.000 1.000 0.662
A. Parameter Selection
The first test examined the effects of watermark length n and IPD quantization step size ∆. We varied
n over {10, 30, 50}, ∆ over {20, 60, 100} ms and fixed the sparisificatoin factor s = 10. The deletion
and insertion probabilities and the network jitter were set to Pd = 0.1, PI = 0, σ = 10ms, respectively.
5000 synthetic flows were embedded with watermarks and another 5000 unwatermarked ones served as
the control group.
Table II shows the true positive rates of our test, when false positive rates were kept under 1%. As we
increase watermark length or quantization step size (embed a ‘stronger’ pattern), detection error decreases.
For the tests in this section, we fix the watermark parameters to {∆ = 100ms, n = 50, s = 10}, which
had the best performance in Table II.
B. Robustness Tests
We evaluated watermark robustness against network jitter, and packet loss and insertion.
1) IPD jitter: From the experimental results in [28], the standard deviation of the Laplacian jitter is
estimated as σ = 10ms. We performed tests with σ varied over {10, 20, 30, 40} ms. The packet drop and
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TABLE VII
AVERAGE KS DISTANCES BETWEEN WATERMARKED AND UNWATERMARKED SYNTHETIC TRACES.
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
n
∆ (ms) 100 80 60
30 0.0177 0.0138 0.0101
40 0.0233 0.0181 0.0133
50 0.0284 0.0223 0.0160
TABLE VIII
AVERAGE KS DISTANCES BETWEEN WATERMARKED AND UNWATERMARKED SSH TRACES.
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
n
∆ (ms) 100 80 60
30 0.0091 0.0081 0.0071
40 0.0120 0.0111 0.0091
50 0.0158 0.0139 0.0123
split probabilities were Pd = 0.1 and PI = 0, respectively. This time, we watermarked 1000 flows from
both synthetic and SSH traces.
The true positive rates are given in Table III. Notice that the watermarks were detected with accuracies
over 98%, even when jitter was as high as 20ms. The detection performance falls sharply when jitter
standard deviations exceeds 40ms. However, such excessively large jitter rarely occurs at proper network
conditions. Hence, our scheme withstands network jitter in normal operating conditions.
2) Packet deletion and insertion: One major improvement of our design over previous work is ro-
bustness against packet deletion and insertion. To verify this, we tested our scheme in a network
with: solely packet deletion with probabilities Pd = {0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.1}, solely packet insertion with
probabilities PI = {0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2}, and both deletion and insertion with probabilities (Pd, PI) =
{(0.01, 0.01), (0.05, 0.05), (0.1, 0.1), (0.15, 0.15)}. During all the tests, the standard deviation of jitter
was fixed as σ = 10ms, and 1000 flows from both synthetic and SSH traces were used.
The results in Tables IV–VI demonstrate watermarks were detected with high accuracies when 5% of
packets were dropped and inserted.
C. Visibility Tests
We first evaluated watermark invisibility with two Level-I attack tests: the Kolmogorov-Simirnov (KS)
test and the multiflow attack (MFA) test.
October 17, 2018 DRAFT
21
TABLE IX
STATISTICS OF BLANK INTERVALS IN THE AGGREGATED FLOW FROM SYNTHETIC TRACES.
Watermarked Unwatermarked
Mean 24.07 25.96
Standard Deviation 5.246 5.187
TABLE X
STATISTICS OF BLANK INTERVALS IN THE AGGREGATED FLOW FROM SSH TRACES.
Watermarked Unwatermarked
Mean 403 395.67
Standard Deviation 20.54 16.84
KS test is commonly applied to comparing distributions of datasets. Given two data sets, the KS distance
is computed as the maximum difference of their empirical distribution functions [13]. For two flows A and
B, the KS distance is given by sup
x
(|FA(x)−FB(x)|), where FA(x) and FB(x) are the empirical pdfs of
IPDs in A and B. We claim two flows are indistinguishable if their KS distance is below 0.036, a threshold
suggested in [13]. We calculated the average KS distance between watermarked and unwatermarked flows
using both synthetic and SSH traces. The results are tabulated in Tables VII and VIII. None of the KS
distances exceed the detection threshold of visibility, which implies the embedded watermarks did not
cause noticeable artifacts in the original packet flows.
MFA is a watermark attack that detects positions of embedded watermarks in interval-based schemes,
When flows which were watermarked using the same watermark are aggregated, the aggregate flow shows
a number of intervals containing no packets (see Figure 10 in [11]). To test whether such ‘visible’ pattern
exists in flows watermarked using our scheme, we combined 10 watermarked and 10 unwatermarked
flows for both the synthetic and SSH traces, and divided the aggregated flows into intervals with length
of length of 70 ms. We then counted the number of blank intervals with no packets in each aggregate
flow. This procedure was repeated 1000 times, and the resulting blank interval statistics are shown in
Tables IX and X. For both synthetic and SSH traces, we see that the number of blank intervals does not
change much after watermarks were embedded. Figure 9 depicts packet counts in each interval of length
70 ms in the aggregated synthetic traces. Comparing Figures 9(a) with 9(b), no clear watermark pattern
is observed. The same observation was made in Figure 10, which depicts packet counts of SSH traces.
Therefore, our scheme is resistant to MFA.
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Fig. 9. MFA tests on synthetic traces: packet counts in intervals of 70 ms in the flow aggregated from (a) 10 unwatermarked
flows and (b) 10 watermarked flows.
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Fig. 10. MFA tests on real SSH traces: packet counts in intervals of 70 ms in the flow aggregated from (a) 10 unwatermarked
flows and (b) 10 watermarked flows.
We next tested the performance of our watermarks under a Level-II attack, BACKLIT, where the
attacker sees both directions of a TCP connection [24]. BACKLIT detects watermarks in SSH flows
based on the differences in round trip times (RTTs) of consecutive TCP requests, ∆RTT . We considered
a stepping stone detection scenario in our campus network. Network jitter in such an environment, like
most enterprise networks, is very small. According to our measurements from our lab machine to the
campus exit node, the jitter standard deviation was as low as δ = 1.6ms. For this level of noise, a
small quantization step size of IPDs, 10 ms, was sufficient to achieve accurate decoding performances
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(c) PlanetLab node: 128.138.207.54
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(e) PlanetLab node: 206.117.37.6
Fig. 11. Comparisons of the ∆RTT distributions before and after adding watermarking.
(true positive rate of 100% and false positive rate of less than 1%). We then examined the effect of
our watermarks on the ∆RTT distribution of a SSH connection, by monitoring the RTT jitter from
our lab to 5 PlanetLab nodes [29]. For each node, we issued 4000 ping requests with ping interval of
100 ms, and divided ping packets into two windows, each consisting of 2000 packets. We transplanted
delays of SSH packets during watermarking onto the ping replies in Window-1, to mimic the effects of
watermarking live TCP requests, and left Window-2 untouched as the control group. Figure 11 depicts
the CDFs of ∆RTT of Window-1, Window-1 with watermarks and Window-2. We notice that except
in Figure 11(a), where the RTT jitter to the destination node was extremely low, the watermarked flow
is not distinguishable from the unwatermarked flow. Our results indicate that BACKLIT only works in
“clean” environments with negligible jitter, and the subtle watermark we inject remains invisible when
moderate jitter exists.
To achieve simultaneous watermark robustness and invisibility, we embed a sparse watermark using the
QIM embedding into flow IPDs. Modeling the network jitter, deletions, and insertions as a communication
channel descried by a HMM, and employing an IDS decoder, we can reliably decoder the watermark.
The QIM embedding meanwhile guarantees that watermark remains invisible to attackers.
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